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SUMMARY 
Alberta does not have a land transfer tax on the sale of real property, nor should the 
province contemplate bringing one in. Instead, if the Alberta government seeks new 
tax revenue, it should institute a sales tax or raise property taxes.
This paper examines previous research on land transfer taxes in Canada, Australia 
and Europe, and concludes that such a tax would only add its own volatility to that 
inherent to Alberta’s resource revenue-based economy. Calculations show that a 
one-per-cent land transfer tax in Alberta would have yielded between $460 million 
and $500 million for provincial coffers in 2017. However appealing that amount of 
revenue sounds, the tax’s benefits do not outweigh its drawbacks.
Land transfer values in Alberta can undergo substantial changes from one year to 
the next, making a land transfer tax a highly precarious revenue source. Given the 
already volatile fluctuations in Alberta’s fiscal situation due to its boom-and-bust 
economy, the volatile nature of a land transfer tax would be thrown into the mix, 
thus compounding the difficulty of making budget decisions. 
Nor would a land transfer tax benefit Albertans who are in the market for a home. 
Studies show that such taxes discourage residential real estate transactions because 
of the burden of the added fees involved. They also impose a larger welfare loss 
per dollar of tax revenue than do residential property taxes. Further, while placing 
a larger financial burden on real estate transactions, the revenue generated by land 
transfer taxes does not displace or exceed the revenue that property taxes bring in.
If land transfer taxes are burdensome for homebuyers, they are equally so for sellers 
who may be compelled to lower their asking prices to make up for the extra costs 
the tax imposes. This leads to a drop in fair market value of homes with a negative 
impact on the volume and value of real estate transactions.
While a land transfer tax could potentially raise a significant amount of revenue for 
the Alberta government it still would be insufficient to cover the province’s current 
fiscal deficit. The situation would be made worse by a negative spin-off effect for 
the economy due to the reduction of transactions, and a slippage in tax revenues 
because of declines in the value and volume of land transfers. This paper estimates 
those declines to be between five and 15 per cent, based on a land transfer tax rate 
1of three per cent, which should be the highest rate if the Alberta government ever considers 
creating such a tax. Meanwhile, the land transfer tax would exact a relatively high tax payment 
from middle-income families – as high as seven per cent of median household income in 
Calgary and Edmonton – which could add a substantial amount to the mortgage debt for 
these families.
Real estate transactions in Alberta are currently subject to a land titles fee, with property 
taxes being the standard for raising revenue from homeowners. This system should not be 
revamped in favour of a land transfer tax, as such a move would only be to the detriment of 
the provincial economy and to individual Albertans.
21. INTRODUCTION
Given the province’s current and projected fiscal deficits, the Alberta government may want 
to consider tapping into new sources of tax revenue.1 One tax that is not levied in Alberta, 
and which is generating substantial amounts of revenue in other provinces, is a land transfer 
tax.2 For example, land transfer taxes generated $2.7 billion for the Ontario government and 
$2 billion for the government of British Columbia in 2017. Given the revenues that a land 
transfer tax generates in these provinces, it would be natural for any Alberta finance minister 
to wonder whether adopting a land transfer tax might be part of the solution to Alberta’s deficit 
problem. We do not know whether the provincial government is actively considering such a tax. 
Nonetheless, we feel that it is interesting to consider whether Alberta should adopt it. If at some 
point in the future a political party or a provincial government proposes a land transfer tax, 
this paper will provide background information that the public can use to assess the merits and 
consequences of introducing this tax.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the rates and revenues generated by land 
transfer taxes in Canadian municipalities and provinces, especially in British Columbia, as well 
as in Australian state governments. In broad terms, we find that provincial land transfer taxes 
can raise significant amounts of revenues, but they have not displaced or exceeded revenues 
that provincial property taxes generate. Land transfer taxes are also very volatile sources of 
tax revenue that increase rapidly during housing market booms, but then decline sharply when 
housing markets crash. 
In Section 3, we review the econometric studies of the impact of land transfer taxes on housing 
prices and sales volumes with the view to answering three basic questions. They are: Who 
bears the burden of a land transfer tax? Does the tax discourage or distort economic activity? Is 
the tax fair? With regard to the first question, the empirical evidence based on the experiences 
in different countries is somewhat mixed, but most studies indicate that current homeowners 
bear a substantial share of the burden through reductions in housing sales prices. With regard 
to the second question, the evidence is again mixed, but many studies find that land transfer 
taxes significantly reduce the volume of residential real estate transactions. The economic 
losses from reductions in housing market transactions are real – some families do not move 
to properties that are more suited to their needs – implying a loss of well-being that can 
exceed the land transfer tax revenue collected. As for fairness, a land transfer tax has the same 
incidence as an annual property tax to the extent that it is capitalized in the value of property 
at the time it is levied. If it is only partially shifted from buyers to owners, a land transfer tax 
will tend to fall more heavily on households that move more frequently, potentially imposing 
a larger burden on younger generations. The authors of many of the studies that we review 
conclude that residential property tax is a better source of revenue than a land transfer tax 
because it causes few distortions in the housing market.
In Section 4, we estimate that a one-per-cent land transfer tax in Alberta would have yielded 
about $500 million in 2017 in the absence of any impact on the value or volume of real estate 
transactions. However, this is likely an over-estimation of the revenue potential once reductions 
in the volume and value of real estate transactions are taken into account. Based on the impact 
1 
A detailed analysis of the fiscal options for dealing with Alberta’s deficit is beyond the scope of this paper. See research 
papers on fiscal issues and reform options at The School of Public Policy’s Alberta’s Fiscal Future project, https://www.
policyschool.ca/albertas-fiscal-future/ .
2 
We will use the term “land transfer tax” to refer to taxes that are levied when real property is transferred from one owner to 
another. In some jurisdictions, such as Australia and the U.K., these taxes are known as stamp duties. 
3of the land transfer tax in Toronto in a study by Dachis et al., (2012a), a one-per-cent land 
transfer tax could reduce the value of a typical transaction by the amount of the tax, i.e., by 
one per cent, and the volume of transactions might fall by seven per cent. Using these rough 
estimates of the tax’s impact on the volume and value of real estate transactions, the projected 
revenue would be eight per cent lower or about $460 million. While this is still a substantial 
amount of revenue, it is equivalent to less than three per cent of the Alberta government’s total 
tax revenues, or about 20 per cent of the education property tax revenues. 
Data on the value of land transfers in Alberta also indicate that, as in other jurisdictions, their 
value can vary substantially from year to year. A land transfer tax in Alberta would be a highly 
volatile source of tax revenue and highly correlated with fluctuations in the province’s non-
renewable resource revenues. A land transfer tax would likely exacerbate the volatility of total 
provincial revenues, making budgeting and fiscal decisions even more difficult than currently. 
Finally, we show that a one-per cent land transfer tax on an average land transfer in 2015 would 
represent six- to seven per cent of median household income in Edmonton and Calgary. This 
would be significantly higher than the four- to five per cent land transfer tax burden on the 
residents of other Alberta cities because housing prices are higher in Alberta’s two largest cities.
Section 5 summarizes the key points in our analysis of the impact of a land transfer tax in 
Alberta. Perhaps not surprisingly in view of the above summary of our findings, we are not in 
favour of the introduction of a land transfer tax in Alberta.
2. LAND TRANSFER TAXES IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA
Land transfer taxes are levied in more than 20 developed countries by central, state or 
municipal governments. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the experience with 
land transfer taxes by municipal and provincial governments in Canada and state governments 
in Australia. 
The land transfer tax rates imposed by four Canadian cities are shown in Table 1.3 Halifax has 
a flat rate of 1.5 per cent of the value of the property, whereas the rates in Toronto, Montreal 
and Quebec City increase with the property’s value. It is important to note, in view of our 
later review of the studies of provincial land transfer taxes, that these rates are applied to 
each portion of the sales value, similar to a progressive income tax structure. For example, in 
Toronto there are four tax rates that range from 0.55 per cent for property sales of $55,000 or 
less, rising to 2.5 per cent for sales above $2 million. On a $1 million residential property sale, 
the municipal land transfer tax would be $16,475, for an average rate of 1.65 per cent. Note that 
a provincial land transfer tax of $16,475 would also be levied on this transaction, bringing the 
total to 3.3 per cent of the sales price.4 
Table 2 indicates that Toronto’s land transfer tax is a relatively important source of revenue 
for the city, as the tax is equivalent to 17.7 per cent of the city’s property tax revenues. While 
the land transfer tax is equivalent to a higher percentage of property tax in Toronto, it raises 
significant revenues in the three other Canadian cities listed. Even with a 1.5-per-cent flat rate, 
Halifax’s land transfer tax raises the equivalent revenues of 7.5 per cent of the city’s property 
taxes. Both Montreal’s and Quebec City’s land transfer taxes raise the equivalent of 5.5 per 
3 
This section is drawn from McMillan and Dahlby (2018a).
4 
See https://www.ratehub.ca/land-transfer-tax-ontario for calculation of land transfer taxes in Ontario.
4cent and 3.6 per cent of property tax revenues. Thus land transfer taxes are significant sources 
of own-source tax revenues for each city, but in no case has the tax eclipsed the role of the 
property tax as the main own-source tax.
TABLE 1 CANADIAN MUNICIPALITIES’ LAND TRANSFER TAX RATES
Municipality
Rates
Value of Property Tax Payable (%)
Halifax All Property 1.5%
Montreal
< $50,000 0.5%
$50,000 - $249,999 1.0%
$250,000 - $499,999 1.5%
$500,000 - $999,999 2.0%
> $1,000,000 2.5%
Quebec City
< $50,000 0.5%
$50,000 - $249,999 1.0%
> $250,000 1.5%
Toronto
< $55,000 0.5%
$55,000 - $249,999 1.0%
$250,000 - $399,999 1.5%
$400,000 - $1,999,999 2.0%
> $2,000,000 2.5%
Sources: City of Toronto (2018), Nova Scotia (2017), Montreal (2017a) and Ville de Québec (2018a).
TABLE 2 CANADIAN MUNICIPALITY TAX REVENUES IN 2017
Municipality Land Transfer Tax Property Tax Total Revenue
Halifax $33,000,000 $442,834,200 $721,748,700
Montreal $152,730,000 $2,806,485,000 $3,342,043,000
Quebec City $30,500,000 $850,400,000 $1,024,800,000
Toronto $716,000,000 $4,046,000,000 $10,540,000,000
Sources: City of Toronto (2017, 6), Halifax Regional Municipality (2017, B10), Montreal (2017b, 104), Ville de Québec 
(2018b, 64).
Five provincial governments also raise revenues through land transfer taxes.5 Table 3 shows the 
land transfer tax rates that these provincial governments levied in 2017. Of the total revenues 
that each of these six provinces raised, only British Columbia’s, Ontario’s and Manitoba’s 
land transfer taxes raised more than two per cent of total annual revenue. British Columbia 
and Ontario have progressive tax rate schedules on residential property, with the top tax rates 
of three per cent in British Columbia and 2.5 per cent in Ontario on properties valued at $2 
million or higher. In 2017 British Columbia’s and Ontario’s land transfer taxes generated $2.03 
billion and $2.73 billion in revenues respectively. As Figure 1 indicates, the land transfer tax 
revenues in Ontario and British Columbia steadily increased until 2008 and then declined in 
both provinces following the financial market crisis. The recovery was more rapid in Ontario 
5 
Saskatchewan and Alberta do not levy land transfer taxes, but collect a land titles registration fee that is payable at the time 
of purchase of a property.
5than in British Columbia, but in both provinces land transfer tax revenues have increased 
fourfold over the past 15 years. 
Remarkably, land transfer tax revenues almost doubled between 2015 and 2017 as a result 
of a booming housing market. These revenues have accordingly increased much faster than 
provincial property tax revenues. The former have become a very significant source of 
revenues in British Columbia where they represent 7.5 per cent of total provincial tax revenues, 
compared to 2.3 per cent in Ontario. In British Columbia, land transfer tax revenues have 
increased from being the equivalent of 26 per cent of property tax revenues to 89 per cent 
for the fiscal year ending in 2017. In Manitoba, land transfer tax revenues more than doubled 
between 2007 and 2016, rising from the equivalent of 1.5 per cent of provincial tax revenues in 
2007 to 2.3 per cent in 2016.
TABLE 3 CANADIAN PROVINCIAL LAND TRANSFER TAX RATES AND REVENUES
Province
Rates 2017 Revenues
Value of Property Tax Payable (%) Land Transfer Tax Property Tax Total Tax Revenue
British Columbia*
< $200,000 1.0%
$2.03 billion $2.289 billion $26.910 billion$200,000 - $1,999,999 2.0%
> $2,000,000 3.0%
Manitoba
< $30,000 0.0%
$83 million $799 million $10.882 billion
$30,000 - $89,999 0.5%
$90,000 - $149,999 1.0%
$150,000 - $199,999 1.5%
> $200,000 2.0%
New Brunswick All Property 1.0% $23 million $503.5 million $4.283 billion
Ontario
< $55,000 0.5%
$2.728 billion $5.868 billion $94.346 billion
$55,000 - $249,000 1.0%
$250,000 - $399,999 1.5%
$400,000 - $1,999,999 2.0%
> $2,000,000 2.5%
Prince Edward Island
< $30,000 0.0%
$6 million $114.1 million $885.4 million
> $30,000 1.0%
*  Note, the land transfer tax rate for B.C. highlighted here is for purchases prior to 2018. In 2018, the B.C. government 
amended the Property Transfer Tax Act, where residential properties with values greater than $3 million are subject to 
an additional two per cent tax rate on top of the three per cent rate paid for a property valued at $2 million. However, 
since this study does not focus on the future estimates of a land transfer tax in B.C., we will not include the new 2018 
rate. The sourced Property Transfer Tax Act is the older version of the act prior to it being amended in 2018.
Sources: British Columbia (2017, 16), “Property Transfer Tax Act, RSBC 1996, c 378” (2016), Manitoba (2017, 4), Manitoba 
(2018), New Brunswick (1983), New Brunswick (2017, 167), Ontario (2018a), Ontario, (2018b, 221), Prince Edward Island 
(2017, 14) and Prince Edward Island (2018). 
6FIGURE 1 LAND TRANSFER TAX REVENUES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ONTARIO
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Editions” (2018).
2.1 A Closer Look at Land Transfer Taxes in British Columbia
Below we provide a more detailed analysis of the growth of the land transfer tax in British 
Columbia, which increased from $390 million in 2003 to $2.03 billion in 2017. Over this 
period, the only change to the land transfer tax rates was in 2010, when a three-per-cent tax 
was levied on the value of property above $2 million. While one of the driving forces in the 
astonishing land transfer tax revenue growth was the 20 per cent increase in the number of 
annual residential property sales over this time, the increase was mainly due to the 166 per 
cent increase in the value of the average residential sales price in British Columbia. This was 
primarily driven by the Greater Vancouver and the Lower Mainland/Southwest Region,6 where 
the average residential sales price increased by more than 200 per cent. The average fair market 
value for a property in this region was $933,810 in 2017. The average fair market value for 
property in British Columbia, excluding property in the Lower Mainland/Southwest Region, 
was only $431,467.7 Based on these property values, we estimate that in 2017 the land transfer 
tax on the average residential property outside of the Lower Mainland/Southwest Region was 
$6,646 and in the Lower Mainland/Southwest Region, it was roughly $19,850. The average land 
transfer tax across B.C. on residential property was over $14,000.
Prior to 2017, the land transfer tax supplemented total tax revenues raised by the provincial 
government and were not nearly as important as provincial property tax revenues. Between 
2003 and 2015, the land transfer tax raised the equivalent of 44 per cent of provincial property 
tax revenues. However, as seen in Figure 2, between 2015 and 2017 land transfer tax revenues 
nearly doubled in British Columbia; they were equivalent to 68 per cent of the provincial 
property tax in 2016 and 89 per cent in 2017. 
6 
The Lower Mainland/Southwest Region includes Vancouver, the Lower Mainland and Fraser Valley areas, as measured by 
Statistics Canada.
7 
The average fair market value for property across British Columbia including property in the Lower Mainland/Southwest 
Region is $715,500.
7FIGURE 2 BRITISH COLUMBIA PROPERTY TAX AND LAND TRANSFER TAX REVENUE
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Source: “British Columbia Budgets: Previous Years Budgets and Fiscal Plans” (2018b).
Why is the land transfer tax revenue growing more rapidly than property tax revenues? One 
reason is that the City of Vancouver implemented land assessment averaging bylaws, which 
provide temporary tax relief to property owners whose land value has increased significantly 
year over year (City of Vancouver, 2018). If the value of a residential property increased by 
19.62 per cent year over year, then all property tax payments for that year are averaged.8 The 
Property Tax Policy Review Commission recommended a 19.62 per cent threshold to be 
eligible for averaging, which is to be set for a five-year period (City of Vancouver 2017, 2). 
The last recommendation occurred in March 2014. Land assessment averaging does not apply 
to land transfer taxes. As a result, land transfer tax revenues have grown with the increase in 
housing prices, while the averaging policy in Vancouver, where the largest assessed property 
values exist, has moderated the growth of property tax revenues. Another reason why 
provincial property taxes are growing at a slower rate than land transfer tax revenues is that the 
provincial school property tax rate has declined in some years.
Figure 3 shows that in most regions properties are valued between $200,000 and $2 million 
and are subject to a two-per-cent land transfer tax rate. However, a substantial number of 
properties in the Lower Mainland/Southwest Region are valued at more than $2 million. These 
properties are subject to the three-per-cent land transfer tax rate on the amount exceeding $2 
million. Thus a purchaser of property in the Lower Mainland/Southwest Region will pay an 
average land transfer tax rate of 2.12 per cent. In other regions where the average value of a 
property is closer to $200,000, purchasers of properties are likely to pay either the one-per-cent 
or two-per-cent rate. For example, in the two northern British Columbia regions of Cariboo 
and Nechako & North Coast, a purchaser will pay the land transfer tax at an average rate of 
1.3 per cent. Only the Lower Mainland/Southwest Region has an average land transfer tax rate 
above two per cent. Even in the Vancouver Island/Coast region, with the second highest value 
on properties, the fair market value for the average property is $506,491 and the average land 
transfer tax rate paid is 1.59 per cent.
8 
If this property does not grow in value by another 19.62 per cent the following year, the owner of the property is expected to 
pay the normal property tax rate for their assessed property value. 
8FIGURE 3 AVERAGE LAND TRANSFER TAX RATE PAID BY ECONOMIC REGION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
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Calculations done by authors based on regional property transfer tax data from  
https://catalogue.data.gov.bc.ca/dataset/property-transfer-tax-data-2017 .
Land transfer tax revenue collections in British Columbia have been concentrated in the 
populous regions with housing booms. Just over 60 per cent of the population live in the 
Lower Mainland/Southwest Region. In 2017, this region contributed 79.5 per cent of all the 
land transfer tax revenue raised in the province, while Vancouver Island/Coast and Thompson/
Okanagan accounted for 13 per cent and nine per cent respectively. Why does the Lower 
Mainland/Southwest contribute such a large portion of total land transfer tax revenues? As 
stated above, the high fair market value for property in the Lower Mainland/Southwest is one 
reason, but this region is also responsible for 57 per cent of all land transfer transactions in 
British Columbia. The combination of high property values and high frequency of transactions 
pushes the region’s share to nearly 80 per cent of land transfer tax revenue in British Columbia. 
FIGURE 4 THE SHARE OF LAND TRANSFER TAX REVENUES RAISED IN EACH B.C. ECONOMIC REGION IN 2017
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9Although there is no official breakdown of the land transfer tax revenues from different 
types of property in British Columbia, we estimate, based on average residential sales prices 
and the number of residential sales, that 90 per cent of the land transfer tax revenues in 2017 
were derived from residential property sales. In 2017, residential property transfers in B.C. 
represented 96 per cent of all real estate transactions. Only four per cent of transactions in B.C. 
involved commercial, industrial or agricultural properties. Thus, the land transfer tax in British 
Columbia is overwhelmingly a tax on residential sales.
2.2 Land Transfer Taxes in Australia
While land transfer taxes are a significant source of revenue for Canadian provinces, especially 
in British Columbia and Ontario, sub-national governments in other countries are more reliant 
on them. A good example is Australia where all of the states have progressive land transfer tax 
rate schedules, with the top marginal tax rates varying from 4.5 per cent in Tasmania to 7.0 per 
cent in New South Wales. Unlike Canadian provinces, the state governments in Australia are 
unable to levy personal or corporate income taxes or general sales taxes, and as a consequence, 
land transfer tax revenues are a very important source of state tax revenues. Figure 5 shows 
that land transfer tax revenues as a percentage of state tax revenues range from 17.6 per cent in 
Tasmania to 30.6 per cent in New South Wales.
FIGURE 5  LAND TRANSFER TAX REVENUES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE AUSTRALIAN STATES’  
TAX REVENUES IN 2016
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Australia (2016, 234).
Not only are land transfer taxes important sources of revenues for the Australian states, they 
are also very volatile sources of revenue. Figure 6 shows that the annual percentage change 
in land transfer tax revenues in the State of Victoria has ranged from a 46.8 per cent annual 
increase in 2002 to a 24.4 per cent year-over-year decline in 2009. 
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FIGURE 6  ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN REVENUES IN THE STATE OF VICTORIA’S LAND TRANSFER TAX 
REVENUES, 1998 TO 2017
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Source: “Previous Budgets: Download Publications from Previous Victorian State Budgets” (2018).
Given the high land transfer tax rates and the relative importance of these taxes in the state 
governments’ revenue structures, it is not surprising that a study by Davidoff and Leigh 
(2013a, 407) concluded that the increase in Australian state land transfer tax from 1993 to 2005 
imposed an annual welfare loss of between $300 million and $800 million by reducing the 
number of housing sales transactions by about 11 per cent. 
To summarize the Australian experience with state land transfer taxes, it is worth quoting at 
length the conclusions of the Henry Report, a major review of the Australian tax system in 2010:
Stamp duties on conveyances [land transfer taxes] are inconsistent with the needs of a 
modern tax system. While a significant source of State tax revenue, they are volatile and 
highly inefficient and should be replaced with a more efficient means of raising revenue.
Conveyance stamp duty is highly inefficient and inequitable. It discourages transactions of 
commercial and residential property and, through this, its allocation to its most valuable 
use. Conveyance stamp duty can also discourage people from changing their place of 
residence as their personal circumstances change or discourage people from making 
lifestyle changes that involve a change in residence. It is also inequitable, as people who 
need to move more frequently bear more tax, irrespective of their income or wealth 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2010a).9
3.  THE IMPACT OF LAND TRANSFER TAXES ON HOUSING PRICES AND  
SALES VOLUMES10
There are three basic economic questions to be asked about any tax: Who bears the burden 
of the tax? Is the tax fair? Does the tax discourage or distort economic activity? Recent 
econometric studies based on international experience with land transfer taxes provide some 
9 
Commonwealth of Australia (2010b).
10 
This section is based on McMillan and Dahlby (2018b).
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insights into the first and third questions. With regard to the first question, it is common in 
most countries for the purchaser of the property to be responsible for the payment of the land 
transfer tax, although there are exceptions such as in Washington D.C., where the payment 
is split between the seller and the purchaser. Although the purchaser is generally responsible 
for paying the land transfer tax, the seller may bear the effective burden in whole or in part 
to the extent that property prices decline as a result. Most studies adopt a Nash bargaining 
framework to model the effect of a land transfer tax on the final sales price. If, for example, the 
housing market is tight, with few properties for sale relative to potential demand, then sellers 
will have more bargaining power than buyers. In these circumstances, the Nash bargaining 
model predicts that sellers will bear a larger share of the burden than buyers because sellers 
have captured most of the “surplus” – the difference between what buyers are willing to pay 
and what sellers are willing to accept. Since a land transfer tax reduces the surplus, sellers are 
predicted to bear most of the burden of a land transfer tax in a tight housing market.
Appendix 1 summarizes the economic effects of land transfer taxes on residential housing 
markets from 11 studies from the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, Australia and Canada. Eight of 
the 11 studies estimated the impact of land transfer taxes on housing prices. Given that these 
studies are based on data from different countries with different housing market conditions, 
one might expect that the degree to which sellers bear the land transfer taxes would vary 
and the results bear out that conjecture. A study of the land transfer tax in France by Bérard 
and Trannoy (2017a, 30) concluded that the tax did not affect housing prices although its 
introduction changed the timing of the transactions. The Besley, Meads and Surico (2014a, 70) 
study concluded that buyers received 60 per cent of the benefit of a land transfer tax (stamp 
duty) holiday in the U.K. Dachis, Duranton and Turner (2012b, 348) found that the introduction 
of a land transfer tax in Toronto reduced the number of transactions by 14 per cent.11 Davidoff 
and Leigh (2013b) concluded that sellers bore 100 per cent of the land transfer tax through a 
reduction in the housing prices in Australia. Finally, three studies – Best and Kleven (2018a), 
Kopczuk and Munroe (2015a) and Slemrod, Weber and Shan (2016a) – concluded that sellers 
bear more than 100 per cent of the land transfer tax burden when there is a “notch” in the land 
transfer tax rate, such that the entire value of a property above a certain level is subject to a 
higher rate. For example, under New York City’s “mansion tax”, residential housing valued 
at more than $1 million is subject to a one-percentage-point increase in the land transfer tax 
applied to the full value of the transaction. An increase in sales price from $999,999 to $1 
million adds a $10,000 tax liability. Not surprisingly, studies of the effects of these notches find 
that properties that would have sold in a price range above the notch are reduced to the notch 
and the decline in the value of some properties can be several times the size of the land transfer 
tax burden created by the notch. These studies show the potentially large, negative impact of 
land transfer taxes on housing prices.
With regard to the third question – how distortionary is a land transfer tax? – the 11 studies 
provide a variety of measures of its impact on the volume of housing market transactions. The 
economic losses from reductions in housing market transactions are real – some families do not 
move to properties that are more suited to their needs– implying a loss of well-being that can 
exceed the size of the land transfer tax, i.e., there is a deadweight loss from the tax.12 In order 
11 
However, Haider, Anwar and Holmes (2016) concluded that the LTT’s introduction in Toronto did not have a statistically 
significant effect on housing sales. They argued that the great recession and mortgage market regulations were responsible 
for the decline in sales.
12 
For example, Hilber and Lyytikäinen (2015a) found that the land transfer tax in the U.K. reduced lifestyle/lifecycle changes 
in housing, but did not affect long-distance and employment-related mobility. 
12
to provide a common way of expressing the economic loss from a land transfer tax, we have 
used the information provided in each study to calculate the implied marginal cost of public 
funds (MCF) for the land transfer tax. See Dahlby (2008a) on the concept and measurement of 
the MCF. See also Appendix 2 for the derivation of the formula for calculating the MCFs. The 
key parameters from the studies that are used to calculate the MCFs are contained in a table in 
the appendix. Using this common metric allows us to compare the otherwise diverse ways of 
expressing the economic impact of a land transfer tax. The estimates of the MCFs range from 
1.00 for the Slemrod, Weber and Shan (2016b) study, which is the only study that did not find 
an impact of Washington’s notched land transfer tax on the volume of transactions, to 5.65 for 
the Australian study by Davidoff and Leigh (2013c). In contrast to the Slemrod, Weber and 
Shan result, the MCF in the Kopczuk and Munroe (2015b) study of the notch created by New 
York City’s mansion tax was 2.41. While there is a wide range of estimates of the MCF for 
the land transfer tax, the size of the welfare loss from generating an additional dollar of land 
transfer tax revenue is higher, the higher the land transfer tax rate. To summarize, a number 
of the studies have found a significant reduction in housing market transactions and that the 
welfare cost of raising tax revenues through a land transfer tax is high. Many of these studies’ 
authors conclude that a land transfer tax is a more distortionary and a less cost-effective way of 
generating tax revenue than a residential property tax. 
This raises the question: Why do taxpayers accept a land transfer tax when it could be replaced 
by an increase in the property tax? The Määttänen and Terviö (2018a) study provides some 
insight into the political attractiveness of the land transfer tax. They found that:
Despite aggregate welfare gains from replacing the transaction tax with a property tax, 
many households may be worse off with such a reform … the share of households that are 
worse off is increasing in the initial transaction tax rate up to tax rates close to the peak of 
the Laffer curve. This result may explain why there appears to be political support even for 
high transaction tax rates that are very distortionary. (Määttänen and Terviö, 2018b, 26).
Only a minority of households expect to move with a 10-year time horizon. If these voters 
do not take into account that the land transfer tax may be capitalized in property values, they 
might expect to defer paying the land transfer tax burden into the future, reducing its impact on 
them in present-value terms relative to an annual property tax.
We now take up the second basic question: Is the land transfer tax burden fair? Since both 
a land transfer tax and a property tax are levied on the value of the property, it is natural 
to compare the fairness of one with the other. However, one important difference is that a 
property tax is levied each year on the property’s owner, while a land transfer tax is only levied 
when the ownership of the property is transferred, 
As previously noted, the distributional effects of these taxes depend on the shifting of the tax 
burden. The literature indicates that the land transfer tax burden may be split between buyer 
and seller, but in many cases individuals will be both a buyer and a seller, sometimes almost 
simultaneously. To the degree that land transfer taxes are shifted to the owners of residential 
property, which Dachis, Duranton and Turner (2012c) concluded in their study of the land 
transfer tax in Toronto, then the tax will be capitalized in the value of all residential property 
at the time that it is imposed. If a reduction in property taxes is also capitalized in residential 
property values, then the overall value of property would not change and the effective incidence 
of the land transfer tax and the property tax would be the same. As McMillan and Dahlby 
(2014) have argued, the value of a family’s residence will generally reflect its lifetime incomes, 
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and the burden of both taxes can be considered roughly proportional to lifetime earnings. 
(Those who inherit more wealth may live in larger, more expensive homes than their lifetime 
labour earnings would otherwise provide, but this makes a property tax more progressive 
than a land transfer tax, if a land transfer tax is not levied on residences transferred as part 
of an estate). Given this caveat, and also recognizing that the capitalization of land transfer 
taxes and property taxes means that it is difficult to assign the burden of these taxes to current 
taxpayers, the distributional impact of a land transfer tax, over the long term, is likely similar 
to a property tax. Finally, a study by Määttänen and Terviö (2018c) which simulated replacing 
a land transfer tax with a property tax in Helsinki, confirmed the conjectures of many other 
studies that households, as a group, would be better off if the land transfer tax were replaced by 
a revenue-neutral increase in a property tax. 
On the other hand, if the land transfer tax is not shifted to owners and is fully borne by home 
buyers, it would impose an additional burden on those who move more frequently –sometimes 
with limited choice because of changes in the location of employment.13 For example, Nowland 
(2007, iii) shows that if a 1.25 per cent land transfer tax were substituted for property taxes, an 
average property owner in Toronto would be better off in present-value terms if their property 
is sold and another bought after 10 years. In other words, frequent movers will pay more often 
and infrequent movers will pay less. Although younger cohorts are more likely to be renters 
initially, over their lifetimes they will on average purchase homes more frequently than older 
cohorts, which means that a non-shifted land transfer tax will generally impose a larger burden 
on younger generations. 
4. A LAND TRANSFER TAX FOR ALBERTA?
Given the province’s current and projected fiscal deficits, the Alberta government may want to 
consider adopting new sources of tax revenue. One consideration in adopting a land transfer 
tax in Alberta is its revenue potential. Of course, there are other considerations, including the 
distribution of the burden of the tax by income group and by region and its effect on the volume 
of real estate transactions. We also provide an assessment of those impacts.
Land title transactions in Alberta can be categorized into six types, but the relevant category 
for our study is the transfer of land, which represents over 97 per cent of the total value and 
number of transfers.14 A cursory review of the data indicates that there were two anomalous 
years in terms of the value of land transfers. In 2010, the value of land title transfers 
skyrocketed to $416.4 billion from $44.3 billion in 2009, before returning to $45.2 billion in 
2011. Another anomaly occurred in 2016 when the value of land title transfers increased to 
$172.6 billion from $54.8 billion in 2015, before declining to the more normal level of $50.7 
billion in 2017. We have been unable to determine the nature of the transactions that resulted 
in these extraordinary increases in the value of land title transfers in 2010 and 2016, but in both 
cases the dramatic increases occurred in Calgary. Given that such large transactions would 
13 
See Commonwealth of Australia (2010c, Chapter 6.2) for an estimate of the effective tax rates based on frequency of moves 
under the states’ land transfer taxes. http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/publications/
papers/Final_Report_Part_1/chapter_6.htm 
14 
We are grateful to Fareeza Khurshed, manager, Statistical Services, Treasury Board and Finance for providing us with these 
data. The other categories of title transfers are orders, transfer of leasehold title, park leases, leasehold title application, 
transfer of part of land and all others.
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either not be subject to a land title tax or would not have occurred if even a very modest land 
title tax had been in place in those years, we have omitted the value of land title transactions in 
those two years in Figure 7.
FIGURE 7 TOTAL VALUE OF TRANSFERS OF LAND IN ALBERTA 2008 TO 2017
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Notes: Value of Transfer of Land was $416.3 billion in 2010 and $172.6 billion in 2016
See Footnote 10.
Excluding 2010 and 2016, the average total value of land transfers was $53.1 billion per year 
from 2008 to 2017. Consistent with what has been observed in other jurisdictions, the value 
of land transfers has exhibited wide variations over relatively short time periods. Between 
2008 and 2009, with the onset of the financial crisis and a decline in oil prices, the value of 
land transfers declined by 28 per cent. During the recovery from 2011 to 2014, they increased 
by 40 per cent, before declining by 20 per cent in 2017. Also, not surprisingly, the number of 
land transfers is pro-cyclical. These data reinforce the view that a land transfer tax in Alberta 
would be a highly volatile source of tax revenue. The variations in land transfer tax revenues 
would be highly correlated with ups and downs in the provincial economy and therefore with 
the province’s non-renewable resource revenues. A land transfer tax would likely exacerbate 
the volatility of provincial revenues, making budgeting and fiscal decisions even more difficult 
than currently.
The annual average values of land transfers from 2008 to 2017, as shown in Figure 8, also 
follow a pro-cyclical pattern and have ranged from just over $300,000 in 2009 and 2011 to a 
high of $433,000 in 2014. While Figure 8 emphasizes the variation in the average value of a 
land transfer over time, there are also large variations in the average value of land transfers 
across municipalities. Figure 9 shows that the average value of land transfers in Alberta cities 
in 2017 ranged from $561,274 in Calgary to $274,744 in Wetaskiwin. Although these data 
do not distinguish residential property transfers from other property transfers, the data from 
British Columbia suggest that residential property constitutes over 90 per cent of land title 
transfers in cities. This suggests that the sale of an average residence in Calgary would likely 
bear twice as much tax as a sale in Wetaskiwin.
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FIGURE 8 THE AVERAGE VALUE OF LAND TRANSFERS IN ALBERTA 2008 TO 2017.
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Calculations by the author.  See Footnote 10.
FIGURE 9 AVERAGE VALUE OF LAND TRANSFERS IN ALBERTA CITIES IN 2017
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In order to compare the size of a land transfer tax to a typical household’s income, we have 
calculated the burden of a one per cent tax on the average land transfer as a percentage of the 
median family’s before-tax income in the Calgary and Edmonton regions and in eight other 
Alberta cities.15 These calculations approximate the burden of a one-per-cent land transfer tax on 
the sale of a typical residence for middle-income families in these Alberta cities. Figure 10 shows 
that a one-per-cent land transfer tax would have been about 7.2 per cent of the median family 
income in the Calgary region and about 6.0 per cent in the Edmonton region and Red Deer in 
2015. In the other smaller cities in Alberta, the burden of a one-per-cent land transfer tax in 2015 
15 
The Calgary region’s and the Edmonton region’s average land transfers are based on a population-weighted average value 
of land transfers in the cities of Calgary, Airdrie and Chestermere, and in Edmonton, Fort Saskatchewan, Leduc, St. Albert 
and Spruce Grove, respectively. The median family incomes for the CMAs in Calgary, Edmonton and the other cities in 
Figure 10 are based on Statistics Canada data in Table 11-10-0017-01.
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would have been between four and five per cent of the median before-tax family income. These 
calculations indicate that the burden of even a modest land transfer tax would be substantial for a 
typical family, although this tax is only paid when a family changes its residence.
FIGURE 10  A ONE-PER-CENT LAND TRANSFER TAX AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE MEDIAN BEFORE-TAX FAMILY 
INCOME IN 2015
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and Cansim Table 11-10-0017-01
The amount of revenue generated by a land transfer tax in Alberta would depend on the tax 
rate or rates if more than one rate applies to the value of a transfer. It also depends on the 
value of an average property transfer and the number of land transfers. Given the levels of 
urbanization in these Alberta municipalities, we feel justified in assuming that the vast majority 
of land transfers, as in B.C., are of residential properties. In the absence of any information 
about the rates that the Alberta government might adopt, we have assumed a one-percentage-
point tax rate on the value of land transfers. If we assume that this tax would have no effect 
on the value of a typical transfer or the volume of real estate transactions, then a one-per-cent 
land transfer tax in Alberta in 2017 would have yielded $507.7 million. To put this figure in 
perspective, the Alberta government’s total tax revenue in 2017-2018 was $21.2 billion and 
the education property tax revenue was $2.446 billion. In other words, in the absence of any 
impact on the value or volume of real estate transactions, a one-per-cent land transfer tax 
would have increased the government’s total tax revenues by 2.4 per cent or yielded about 
20 per cent of the education property tax revenue.16 However, imposing a land transfer tax 
would most likely have negative impacts on the volume and value of real estate transactions. 
Our survey of the literature on the impact of land transfers in other jurisdictions indicates that 
there is a very wide range of estimates of the magnitudes of these effects. To provide some 
perspective of how changes in the volume and value of real estate transaction might affect 
projected revenues, we have used the estimates of the impact of the land transfer tax in Toronto 
by Dachis et al. (2012d) who found that the introduction of Toronto’s land transfer tax increased 
16 
To put the revenues from a one-per-cent land transfer tax in perspective, raising an additional $500 million in education 
property tax in 2018-2019 would have required an increase in the residential mill rate from 2.56 to 3.08 and the non-
residential mill rate from 3.76 to 4.53. Calculations based on Alberta Tax Plan Tables at https://www.alberta.ca/budget-
documents.aspx#18-19 .
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the total transfer tax rate on the median property value from two per cent to four per cent. 
They concluded that property values declined by the amount of the tax and that the volume of 
transactions declined by 14 per cent. Scaled to a one-per-cent land transfer tax in Alberta, their 
study suggests that the value of a typical transaction would fall by the amount of the tax, i.e., 
one per cent, and the volume of transactions might fall by seven per cent. Using these rough 
estimates of the tax’s impact, the projected revenue would be 92 per cent of the previous figure 
or $467 million. Of course, the government of Alberta might impose a substantially higher rate, 
as in Ontario and British Columbia, but the slippage in tax revenues because of declines in the 
value and volume of land transfers would be more than five per cent, perhaps as much as 15 per 
cent for a three-per-cent land transfer tax. 
To summarize, a land transfer tax has the potential to raise a significant amount of revenue in 
Alberta in the $0.5 billion to $1.5 billion range, but obviously not enough to cover the current 
fiscal deficit. However, the tax would impose an economic cost through the reduction in real 
estate transactions than would otherwise have taken place. It would require a relatively high 
tax payment by middle-income families, especially in the Calgary and Edmonton regions, 
when they purchase another home and could in some cases add a significant amount to their 
mortgage debt.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Should Alberta adopt a land transfer tax? Our recommendation is “No”. A large body of recent 
empirical studies indicates that land transfer taxes discourage residential property transactions 
and impose a larger welfare loss per dollar of tax revenue than is associated with residential 
property taxes. Furthermore, land transfer taxes are highly volatile sources of tax revenue. The 
variations in land transfer tax revenues would be highly correlated with ups and downs in the 
provincial economy and therefore with the province’s non-renewable resource revenues. A land 
transfer tax would exacerbate the volatility of provincial revenues, making budgeting and fiscal 
decisions even more difficult than currently. Land transfer taxes are no more progressive than 
a property tax. Attempts to make land transfer taxes more progressive by instituting notches 
in the rate structure are particularly distortionary. Also, a one-per-cent tax on an average 
land transfer in 2015 would represent six- to seven per cent of median household income in 
Edmonton and Calgary, a substantially higher rate than in other Alberta cities.
In our view, if the Alberta government feels the need to increase its tax revenues to deal 
with the province’s fiscal situation, other new revenue sources should be considered, such as 
a provincial sales tax, which has a relatively low marginal cost of public funds (see Dahlby 
and Ferede, 2012, 2018), or the province could increase the education property tax instead of 
introducing a land transfer tax.
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APPENDIX 1. SUMMARY OF STUDIES OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LAND 
TRANSFER TAXES
Study Description of Data Incidence of the Land Transfer Tax Impact on Transactions
Estimated Marginal Cost 
of Public Funds Discussion
Hilber and Lyytikäinen 
(2015b)
Census data on U.K. 
households from 1996 to 
2008, with self-assessed 
values of home and 
data on households that 
moved in the following 
year.
Not included in the 
study.
A two- percentage-
point increase in stamp 
duty reduced household 
mobility by 35% to 42%.
1.73 Stamp duties reduced 
life-style/life-cycle 
changes in housing 
but did not affect 
long-distance and 
employment-related 
mobility. A property tax 
is a more efficient means 
of raising tax revenues 
than a stamp duty.
Dachis, Duranton and 
Turner (2012e)
Data on residential real 
estate transactions in 
Toronto neighbourhoods 
close to bordering 
municipalities without 
the municipal land 
transfer tax between 
2006 and 2008.
The land transfer tax 
reduced housing prices 
by the amount of the 
tax.
The Toronto land 
transfer tax reduced 
housing transactions by 
14 per cent.
1.29 Property taxes are less 
distortionary than a land 
transfer tax.
Study Description of Data Incidence of the Land Transfer Tax Impact on Transactions
Estimated Marginal Cost 
of Public Funds Discussion
Besley, Meads and 
Surico (2014b)
Stamp duty holiday 
in 2008 in the U.K. 
eliminated the one-per-
cent tax for transaction 
in the £125,000 to 
£175,000 range. 
Prices declined by 
60 per cent of the 
reduction in the stamp 
duty.
Transactions during 
the stamp duty holiday 
increased by eight per 
cent. This is a short-
term timing effect as 
indicated by declines in 
transactions before and 
after the holiday period.
1.04
with a 95 per cent 
confidence interval of 
1.02 to 1.15
The stamp duty in the 
U.K. has significant 
effects on residential 
prices and the volume of 
transactions.
Best and Kleven (2018b) Administrative data on 
stamp duties between 
2004 and 2012 in the 
U.K. Focused on the 
effects on transactions 
at notches in stamp 
duty, from 0 to 1% at 
£125K, 1% to 3% at 
£250K, 3% to 4% at 
£500K, 4% to 5% at 
£1,000K, and 5% to 7% 
at £2,000K.
The effect of a notch in 
the rate schedule is to 
reduce the house price 
by four to five times the 
size of the tax liability 
jump.
The stamp holiday 
in 2008-2009 in the 
£125K to £175K price 
range increased housing 
transactions by 20 per 
cent in the short run.
1.10 Reductions in stamp 
duty are an effective 
instrument for short-run 
fiscal stimulus.
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Study Description of Data Incidence of the Land Transfer Tax Impact on Transactions
Estimated Marginal Cost 
of Public Funds Discussion
Bérard and Trannoy 
(2017b)
There was an increase 
in the land transfer tax 
(droits de mutation) 
by 0.7 percentage 
points in March 2014, 
from 3.8 % to 4.5% in 
many (but not all) of 
France’s départements. 
The municipalities also 
imposed a land transfer 
tax of 1.20% and the 
central government 
0.09% for tax collection 
and administration.
Buyers and sellers are 
more likely to move the 
sale date (anticipation 
effect) than to change 
the sale price. 
The announcement 
of an increase in the 
land transfer tax 
increased sales by 28% 
in the month before 
its implementation. 
Housing transactions 
regressed 7% during 
the immediate time 
after the increase. The 
average net effect 
corresponds to a drop 
in the transactions of 
4.6% over a period of 
10 months following the 
implementation date.
1.47 The elasticity of the tax 
base with respect to 
the tax rate was -0.45 
and the elasticity of 
the departmental tax 
revenue with respect to 
the tax rate was 0.65 
(on the increasing side 
of the Laffer curve). An 
alternative estimate of 
the MCF based on the 
revenue elasticity is 
1/0.65 = 1.54 based on 
the response of total 
revenues to all three 
levels of government.
Study Description of Data Incidence of the Land Transfer Tax Impact on Transactions
Estimated Marginal Cost 
of Public Funds Discussion
Kopczuk and Munroe 
(2015c)
This study examined 
the impact of the 
“mansion tax” in NYC 
and NJ. Residential 
housing ≥$1M subject to 
1% increase in the land 
transfer tax applied 
to the full value of the 
transaction. An increase 
in sales price from 
$999,999 to $1 million 
adds a $10,000 tax 
liability. A 1.425% tax 
is also levied in NYC 
for transactions above 
$500,000.
With the mansion tax, 
sales that would have 
been up to $1,021,000 
shift to the notch. 
Sellers take price cuts 
larger than the cost of 
the tax on average and 
bear up to 200% of the 
tax. For the 1.425% tax, 
the sellers bear 82.7% 
of the burden on newly 
developed property.
The one percentage 
point of land transfer 
tax applied at the $1 
million limit eliminated 
2,800 transactions, or 
approximately 26.1 per 
cent of the transactions 
that would have 
occurred in the absence 
of the mansion tax. A 
significant amount of 
bunching of sales prices 
occurs just below the $1 
million.
2.41 Price reductions above 
the notch are permanent 
and dispersion of sales 
prices conditional on 
list prices increases, 
indicating a decline in 
market efficiency. “The 
notched design of the 
tax can destroy a market 
for housing with values 
close to the notch, which 
has not been previously 
recognized.”
Study Description of Data Incidence of the Land Transfer Tax Impact on Transactions
Estimated Marginal Cost 
of Public Funds Discussion
Slemrod, Weber and 
Shan (2016c)
Data on all residential 
transactions in 
Washington D.C. 1999 
to 2010. Examining the 
sales of houses after 
the implementation of 
two price notches in the 
land transfer tax, one in 
2003, when the tax rate 
increased from 2.2% 
to 3% for sales above 
$250,000, subsequently 
eliminated in 2004, 
and in 2006 when the 
tax rate increased from 
2.2% to 2.9% for houses 
above $399,999.
The introduction of the 
notches affected the 
sales price rather than 
the timing of the sales. 
Prices $5,000 above 
the notch (1.8 times 
the increase in the tax 
liability) are reduced to 
the notch price. 
The introduction of 
notches did not affect 
the timing of sales or the 
volume of transactions. 
1.00 The efficiency loss from 
introducing a residential 
land transfer tax is small.
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Study Description of Data Incidence of the Land Transfer Tax Impact on Transactions
Estimated Marginal Cost 
of Public Funds Discussion
Buettner (2017a) Data on land transfer tax 
revenues for 16 German 
state governments from 
2002 to 2015. In 2006, 
state governments 
gained the ability to 
increase land transfer 
tax rates from 3.5%. 
By 2015, the median 
state land transfer tax 
increased to 5%. 
No data on sales prices. A one- percentage- 
point increase in 
the land transfer tax 
increased revenues 
by 12.7%. The 
implied reduction in 
transaction from the 
1.5- percentage- point 
increase in the median 
land transfer tax rate 
was 24%.
1.57 The semi-elasticity of 
revenues with respect to 
the tax rate is 0.127. An 
additional euro of land 
transfer tax revenue 
is associated with a 
67-cent welfare loss. 
The land transfer tax is 
a rather costly source of 
tax revenue. 
Study Description of Data Incidence of the Land Transfer Tax Impact on Transactions
Estimated Marginal Cost 
of Public Funds Discussion
Davidoff and Leigh 
(2013d)
Data on housing 
prices by area code 
in Australian states 
for the years between 
1995 and 2005. Land 
transfer tax (stamp 
duty) rates vary by state 
and with a progressive 
rate structure. In NSW 
marginal land transfer 
tax rates vary from 
1.25% for property 
below $14,000 to 7% 
for property above $3 
million. Average rates 
are increased from 2.4% 
in 1993 to 3.3% in 2005 
as a result of bracket 
creep.
Elasticity of house 
prices with respect to 
land transfer tax rates is 
-0.26. Prices fall by the 
full amount of the tax.
In bordering postal 
codes, the elasticity was 
even higher (-0.46.)
A 10% increase in 
stamp duty lowers 
turnover by 6% over the 
following three years. 
The increase in the 
average stamp duty rate 
between 1993 and 2005 
is estimated to have 
reduced transactions 
by 23%.
5.65 In 2005, the welfare 
loss per sale forgone 
is estimated to be 
between $8,000 and 
$20,000.
Study Description of Data Incidence of the Land Transfer Tax Impact on Transactions
Estimated Marginal Cost 
of Public Funds Discussion
Bogataj, McDonnell, and 
Bogataj (2016)
Model the lifecycle 
transitions between 
different types of 
housing units based on 
housing needs. Data 
from European Union, 
focus on Spain.
Net present value of 
taxation for an aging 
individual over time with 
an 8% land transfer tax, 
0.5% annual property 
tax and a 6% interest 
rate is 35,43.83 euros. 
A reduction in the land 
transfer tax from 8% to 
2% can be offset by a 1% 
increase in the annual 
property tax, to get the 
same net present value 
of tax revenues.
A senior citizen with 
decreasing functional 
capacities will not move 
into a home that suits 
his or her capabilities 
to avoid the upfront 
land transfer tax. More 
likely to move if they 
are paying a property 
tax that would be less 
because of a smaller 
home/property. Allow a 
growing family to move 
into larger property. 
N/A A recurring (periodic) 
taxation of housing 
property would be 
better suited to deal 
with shrinking cities and 
an aging population 
than a property 
transaction tax. The 
upfront cost of the 
PTT causes individuals 
in Spain not to move, 
leaving over three 
million houses empty in 
2014. More permits for 
remodelling homes were 
applied for after the 
land transfer tax came 
into effect.
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Estimated Marginal Cost 
of Public Funds Discussion
Määttänen and Terviö 
(2018d)
Simulation model of the 
effect of land transfer 
tax on the housing 
market in Helsinki, 
Finland based on 2004 
data on housing prices 
and household incomes.
Housing prices decline 
with higher land 
transfer tax rates. The 
majority of households 
were worse off when 
a 2% land transfer tax 
was replaced with an 
equal yield property 
tax increase. Only 
33% of households are 
expected to move within 
the city in a 10-year 
period. Non-movers 
are worse off with the 
property tax increase 
but their losses are 
relatively small.
An increase in the land 
transfer tax reduces 
the volume of housing 
transactions that is 
similar to the reduction 
found in previous 
econometric studies. 
1.30 The MCF increases 
rapidly with the increase 
in the land transfer tax 
rate. MCF = 3.00 at 
a 7% rate. The Laffer 
curve of land transfer 
tax revenues peaks at a 
10% rate. 
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APPENDIX 2. MEASURING THE MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS FROM A 
LAND TRANSFER TAX
Below we outline a simple model for calculating the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), 
a measure of the efficiency loss from a land transfer from econometric studies that report 
the initial tax rate, the increase in the tax rate and the percentage reduction in the number of 
housing transactions. 
The basic model for calculating the MCF is shown in Figure 1 below and based on Dahlby 
(2008b, Chapter 2.4). An increase in the land transfer tax rate from τ
0
 to τ1 reduces the 
number of land transfers from M
0
 to M1. The loss of consumer surplus is the area α+ β. The 
increase in tax revenues (ignoring the interaction with other tax bases) is α- γ. The MCF is 
equal to (α+ β)/( α- γ).
Below we derive a formula for the MCF based on the initial tax rate, τ
0
, the increase in the tax 
rate, Δτ, and the proportionate rate of change in the number of transactions, ρ. Since (α + β) = 
Δτ∙0.5∙(M
0
 + M1), (α –γ) = Δτ∙M1 – τ0(M0 – M1), and ρ + 1 = M1/M0, the MCF can be written as:
MCF
0.5  2 ( )
 1 ( )  0 ( )  
 




T
M0M1
Land transfer
tax rate
Number of land transfers  
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TABLE A1 SUMMARY OF KEY PARAMETER RESULTS AND MCF CALCULATIONS
Study τ0 Δτ ρ MCF
Dachis, Duranton and Turner (2012f) 0.02 0.02 -0.14 1.29
Davidoff and Leigh (2013e) 0.024 0.009 -0.23 5.65
Best and Kleven (2018c) 0.01 -0.01 0.20 1.10
Besley, Meads and Surico (2014c) 0.01 -0.01 0.08 1.04
Kopczuk and Munroe (2015d) 0.0145 0.01 -0.26 2.41
Hilber and Lyytikäinen (2015c) 0.01 0.02 -0.347 1.73
Slemrod, Weber and Shan (2016d) 0.022 0.008 0.00 1.00
Bérard and Trannoy (2017c) 0.0509 0.007 -0.04 1.47
Buettner (2017b)* -- -- -- 1.57
Määttänen and Terviö (2018e)** -- -- -- 1.30
*  The MCF for the Buettner study was calculated based on the formula MCF = 1/τ∙η where τ is the tax 
rate and η is the semi-elasticity of revenue with respect to the tax rate, with τ = 0.05 and η= -12.7.
**  Määttänen and Terviö (2018f) computed the MCF based on their computable general equilibrium model 
of the housing market in Finland.
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